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Abstract 
In public key cryptosystem, the protecting of public keys against intruders is very important. Usually, key authentication schemes 
are required to preserve public keys. Most of the key authentication schemes require one or more authorities to authenticate 
public keys. Some other key authentication schemes require no authorities to authenticate public keys. The Zuhua Shao proposed 
a new scheme to overcome the drawbacks of existing schemes, but it has some vulnerabilities. This scheme relies only on key 
server for certificate generation. In a distributed network, the server can easily impersonate other legitimate users and listen the 
messages directed to them. Moreover, in this scheme, users’ passwords are stored in the form of plaintext. In this paper, slight
modifications are pointed out to overcome these severe drawbacks. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Cryptography algorithms are divided into two broad categories: Symmetric key cryptography and Public key 
cryptography. In Symmetric key cryptography, two people should mutually agree on a cryptosystem and a secret key 
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which is to be distributed in a secure manner with the help of trusted key distribution center (KDC). If one person 
wants to transmit messages to the other, the mutually recognized secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
The serious problem in symmetric key cryptosystem is the key distribution, in a secure manner. This problem is the 
motivation to develop the public-key cryptosystem. In public-key cryptography, two people mutually agree on a 
cryptosystem and generate a pair of different keys, named as public key and private key. The public key of each user 
is publicly available and is accessible through public-key directory. If a sender wants to transmit message he/she 
uses the public key of the receiver accessed from the public-key directory to encrypt the messages. When the 
receiver receives the encrypted messages, receiver uses his/her private key to decrypt the messages. 
 In the past, many schemes have proposed to provide assurance on public key of all the authorized users, such as 
ID based schemes [8], certificate-based schemes [9, 10], and self-certified public-key scheme [11]. But these 
schemes require one or more authorities as a trusted center or third party for ratification. 
 In 1996, Horng and Yang [6] proposed a key authentication scheme, HY-scheme, which uses a server as an 
authority. In their scheme, each user generates his/her certificate using the combination of password from the server 
and his/he private key. The server stores each user’s hashed password, f(PWD),where PWD is the password of the 
user and f() is a one-way hash function, in a table known as verification table or secure password table. Hence, the 
server cannot derive and know the PWD of the user because one-way functions are not reversible [12,13].Three 
years later, Zhan et al.[5] proved that HY-scheme was prone to the password guessing attack [14]. Password 
guessing attacks can be classified into two. An improved scheme, ZLYH-scheme succeeded in preventing the 
guessing attack, but failed to achieve nonrepudiation. In 2003, a new key authentication scheme was proposed by 
Chi Lee, Shiang, Hwang and Hua Li [4], LHL-scheme, to achieve non-repudiation. It is based on the research work 
on key authentication schemes of HY-scheme [6] and ZLYH-scheme [5]. But the LHL-scheme has two security 
flaws, as suggested by A.Peinado in 2004 [2], the primary being the recovery of user’s private key from his/her 
certificate and other public values. The second significant drawback is certificate verification process is independent 
of certificate, for a given public key. Later, A.Peinado improved LHL-scheme through the use of access control 
equation for public key verification without generating the certificate.   
 In 2004, Zhang and Kim [3] independently performed cryptanalysis of LHL-scheme and proposed a modified 
LHL-scheme. Their scheme is based on three security parameters and it is almost hard to calculate private key from 
certificate and other public parameters. Also it prevents guessing attack and achieves nonrepudiation along with 
thorough certificate verification. Later in 2004, Zuhua Shao proposed a new key authentication scheme for 
cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms [1]. It is based on A. Pienado [2], Zhang and Kim [3] and LHL [4] 
research work. He proved that A. Peinado’s modification is not secure as it suffers from guessing attack and also 
revealed that Zhang and Kim’ s scheme which is based on three security prerequisites is expensive in an open 
environment. To overcome these drawbacks, Zuhua Shao proposed a new scheme in which a trusted key server is 
used, to generate certificate for each legal user. However, Zuhua Shao scheme’s dependency on key server as a 
trusted third party is not secure when the server is compromised. Moreover, the availability of passwords in 
plaintext form of each user in server as (ID, PWD) pairs is not preferable as suggested by Purdy[15]. Hence it is 
preferable to utilize the one-way function to hide original password to improve the security.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 refers detailed discussion of Zuhua Shao scheme is 
presented and its drawbacks are highlighted in Section 3. Our proposal is explained in Section 4.  Finally conclusion 
and future research is given in Section 5. 
2. The Zuhua Shao  key authentication scheme 
This scheme [1] consists of three phases such as Setup phase, Registration phase, and Authentication phase 
which are described in the following sub sections. 
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  2.1 Setup phase 
 In this scheme, the key server S chooses the following public parameters: 
   (1)  p is a large prime number. 
   (2)  q is a prime divisor of p -1. 
   (3)  g is an element of order q in the finite field GF(p). 
   (4)  h() is a one-way hash function 
   (5)  The public key ys = g
xs mod p of the key server S, where xs is the private key of the key server S. 
  2.2 Registration phase 
   Every user (U) has a password PWDu to log into the system. The user (U) chooses his private key xu and 
computes the corresponding public key yu=g
xu mod p. To place his public key yu on the public key server S the user 
(U) does the following steps: 
(1)  Choose a random integer r  in  Zq .
(2)  Compute R = gr mod p                                                                                                               (1)                                
(3)  Compute w = ys
PWDu +r mod p                                                                                                    (2)                                       
(4)  Compute v =h(IDu ,yu) xu + rR mod q                                                                                        (3)                                       
(5)  Send (IDu, yu, w, v) to the key server S in a public channel. 
         After receiving (IDu, yu, w, v), the key server S does the following steps: 
(6)  Recover the password PWDu of the user U by using user’s identity IDu.
(7)  Compute R/  = w (xs) -1 / g PWDu  mod p                                                                                        (4)                                        
     (8)  Check gv = yu
h(IDu, yu) R/ R/                                                                                                          (5) 
 (9)  If the check fails, S terminates the protocol run with failure. Otherwise Server does the following: 
      (i)    Choose a random integer k in Zq
 * . 
      (ii)   Compute K = gk mod p ,  e = h(IDu , yu ,K)                                                                         (6)                                       
      (iii)  Compute C= k – e(ysxs + v) mod q                                                                                      (7)     
      (iv)  The information (IDu, yu, R, C, e) of the user (U) are stored in the public key table hosted in the key          
               server. 
2.3 Authentication phase  
When one requester inquires the public key for the user (U) with the identity IDu, the requester does the 
following steps: 
(1) Ask the key server S for the public key and the certificate of the user ( U) with the identity IDu in a public 
        channel (IDu, yu, R
/, C, e). 
(2)  Compute K/ = gC (ys
ys yu
h(IDu, yu) R R) e mod p                                                                            (8) 
(3)  Check h(IDu ,yu ,K
/) = e. 
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By following the above procedure, if the step3 equation found true the requester accepts yu as the authorized 
public key of the user (U). 
 The above scheme prevents the guessing attack and the security of the password table and user’s public key is 
obtained through Schnorr and ElGamal Digital signatures respectively [1]. Also it achieves correct verification of 
user’s public key certificate. This scheme does not require any of the security pre-requisites similar to this of Zhang 
and Kim’s scheme except that key sever is considered as trusted by users. 
3. Cryptanalysis of  the Zuhua Shao scheme 
According to Zuhua Shao Scheme the passwords (PWD) are stored in the server which is also responsible for 
generation of certificates. Due to this, we pointed out the following drawbacks in his scheme. 
(1) The storage of a user’s identity (ID) and his/her password (PWD) as pair of (ID, PWD) in a plaintext 
format, but neither in encrypted nor in hashed form, is a major drawback of Zuhua Shao scheme. This is 
because, such type of storage is more prone to attacks by ill-minded users and intruders as suggested by 
Purdy [15]. 
(2) Moreover, the complete dependence on server for certificate generation, and availability of users’  
passwords in plaintext format stored in the server, leads to a serious security flaw in case when the server 
is compromised. 
     As a result of the compromised server, a user with identity IDu may get a false certificate Cf which is 
calculated by using false public key yuf and the corresponding false private key xuf . Also, the compromised server 
chooses a false random number rf , and computes corresponding  Rf . Then as server knows password PWDu of user 
with identity IDu , it calculates false w as  wf and false v as vf  which leads to following Scenario. 
      wf =  ys
PWDu + rf  mod p                                                                                                                (9)   
      vf =h(IDu, yuf) xuf + rf Rf  mod q                                                                                                 (10)    
Then the server chooses random number K in Zq.
      Calculates K = gk mod p ,  e = h(IDu , yuf , K)                                                                           (11)     
      Then compute Cf= k – e( ys xs + vf ) mod q                                                                               (12)    
                                                           
   Then the dishonest server stores in its public password table the forged public key yuf of the forged Certificate 
Cf (IDu, yuf, Rf ,Cf, e).  Any Sender who wants to communicate with the user with identity IDu accesses the values in 
public password table and computes 
  K/ = g Cf (ys
ys xs
xs  yuf
h(IDu, yuf) Rf
Rf) mod p                                                                               (13)    
      And Checks h(IDu ,yuf, K
/) = e.                                                                                                   (14)       
This is proved according to Zuhua shao scheme [1]. These results in, that the sender considers the forged public 
key yuf as legal public key of user with identity IDu and encrypts messages with this false public key. These 
messages intended to user with IDu are intercepted and read by the intruders.  
  We analyze that, the Zuhua Shao scheme is similar to a public key authentication scheme based on Certificate 
Authority. But, the prime requisite of earlier schemes like HY [6], ZLYH [5] and others is to secure users’ 
passwords in the server and to make users generate their own certificates without any trusted third party. But in 
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Zuhua Shao scheme, by the involvement of sever in certificate generation and storing the passwords in plaintext 
form, his scheme has diverted from the prime requisites of earlier schemes. 
4. Modifications to the Zuhua Shao scheme 
In order to overcome the security weaknesses, the following modifications to the Zuhua Shao scheme are 
proposed.  
(a) Each user can generate his/her certificate without involvement of the server, similar to the earlier     
 schemes except in Zuhua Shao scheme.    
(b) In Equation 7 the certification generation is done by the explicit involvement of private key xs. But the 
certificate generation can be done without explicit involvement of private key. It increases the complexity 
to the attacker to obtain the exact private key from the certificate. 
(c) The new scheme can be developed, where the key server as a trusty authority only for publishing and 
accessing   resources but not as a certificate generator, which avoids the insecurity of public key. 
5. Conclusion and Future research 
Zuhua Shao scheme’s dependency on key server as a trusted third party is not secure when the server is 
compromised. Moreover, in this scheme, the availability of passwords in plaintext form of each user in server is not 
preferable in a network. The Zuhua Shao scheme is similar to a public key authentication scheme based on 
certificate authority. But, the prime requisite of earlier schemes is to secure users’ passwords in the server and each 
user has to generate his/her certificate without any trusted third party. 
The proposal, we presented so far comprises a naive idea, to develop a secure key authentication scheme. By 
storing hashed passwords in the key server also provides high security for users’ passwords. We can also further 
strengthen the process of authentication by incorporating digital signature verification in registration and 
authentication phases of the scheme. 
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